Add to ORKGMultiple Realizability (MR) must still be regarded as one of the principal arguments against type reductionist accounts of higher-order properties and their special laws. Against this I argue that there is no unique MR but rather a multitude of MR categories. In a slogan: MR is itself “multi-realized”. If this is true then we cannot expect one unique reductionist strategy against MR as an anti-reductionist argument. The main task is rather to develop a taxonomy of the wide variety of MR cases and to sketch possible reductionist answers for each class of cases. The paper outlines some first steps in this direction
Non-reductive physicalists have long held that the special sciences offer explanations of some pheno...
Multiply realizable kinds are scientifically problematic, for it appears that we should not expect d...
In recent decades, a number of authors have relied on the multiple realizability argument to reject ...
Multiple Realizability (MR) must still be regarded as one of the principal arguments against type re...
Multiple Realizability (MR) must still be regarded as one of the principal arguments against type re...
Multiple realizability (MR) is traditionally conceived of as the feature of computational systems, a...
This paper addresses the recent resurgence of Nagel style reduction in the philosophical literature....
Multiple realisation prompts the question: how is it that multiple systems all exhibit the same phen...
Multiply realizable properties are those whose realizers are physically diverse. It is often argued ...
Multiple realisation prompts the question: how is it that multiple systems all exhibit the same phen...
Multiple realizability seems to be empirically justified and provides the conceptual basis for the a...
Hilary Putnam’s ‘Psychological Predicates’ (1967) represents the first formalization of the argument...
This paper examines the multiple realizability thesis within a causal framework. The beginnings of t...
For nearly thirty years, there has been a consensus (at least in English-speaking countries) that re...
Anti-reductionists hold that special science explanations of some phenomena are objectively better t...
Non-reductive physicalists have long held that the special sciences offer explanations of some pheno...
Multiply realizable kinds are scientifically problematic, for it appears that we should not expect d...
In recent decades, a number of authors have relied on the multiple realizability argument to reject ...
Multiple Realizability (MR) must still be regarded as one of the principal arguments against type re...
Multiple Realizability (MR) must still be regarded as one of the principal arguments against type re...
Multiple realizability (MR) is traditionally conceived of as the feature of computational systems, a...
This paper addresses the recent resurgence of Nagel style reduction in the philosophical literature....
Multiple realisation prompts the question: how is it that multiple systems all exhibit the same phen...
Multiply realizable properties are those whose realizers are physically diverse. It is often argued ...
Multiple realisation prompts the question: how is it that multiple systems all exhibit the same phen...
Multiple realizability seems to be empirically justified and provides the conceptual basis for the a...
Hilary Putnam’s ‘Psychological Predicates’ (1967) represents the first formalization of the argument...
This paper examines the multiple realizability thesis within a causal framework. The beginnings of t...
For nearly thirty years, there has been a consensus (at least in English-speaking countries) that re...
Anti-reductionists hold that special science explanations of some phenomena are objectively better t...
Non-reductive physicalists have long held that the special sciences offer explanations of some pheno...
Multiply realizable kinds are scientifically problematic, for it appears that we should not expect d...
In recent decades, a number of authors have relied on the multiple realizability argument to reject ...